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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
15503

-vsBRENT LESLIE DOCK,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of assault by
a prisoner, a third degree felony, Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-102.5 (1953), as amended, in the Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable G. Hal
Taylor, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The defendant was charged by information with
aggravated assault by a prisoner in violation of Utah Code
Ann.§ 76-5-103.5 (1953), as amended.

The defendant was

tried by a jury and on October 13, 1977, he was convicted
of the lesser included offense, assault by a prisoner,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-102.5 (1953), as amended.

The

defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not
more than five years, to run consecutively with his
current term.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the conviction
below.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The witnesses at trial presented conflicting
facts; however, they were in agreement as to the general
series of events.
On the night in question, the defendant, Brent
--

Leslie Dock, was a prisoner in Cell No. A-314 in medium
security at the Utah State Prison.

During the early

morning hours, Officer Donald F. Morrell was making a
cell count when he kicked a Coke can that was lying in
front of the defendant's cell (R.204).

The defendant

and the officer exchanged words at that time (R.204).
The officer passed in front of the defendant's cell a
short time later, and at that time the defendant threw
the can (R.191,204).

The defendant claimed he was merely

throwing the can over the rail (R.191), and the officer
testified that the can struck him (R.204).

Words were

-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

again exchanged at the defendant's cell (R.206), and the
officer informed the defendant that he would be written
up for hitting an officer (R.206).
Jack Manneh came on duty at 6:00 a.m. that same
morning and was instructed by his supervisor to transport
Dock to maximum security.

At about 6:10 a.m., Officer

Jack Manneh went to the defendant's cell to take him to
maximum security (R.142).

Officer Manneh was accompanied

to the cell by Officer Wells (R.146), and Officer Morrell
was at the control panel for the cell doors (R.147).
balance of the testimony is in great conflict.

The

Officer

Manneh testified that he spoke to the def.endant before he
entered the cell and before the doors were opened, and
informed the defendant that he had been instructed to take
him to maximum security as a result of the earlier incident
with Officer Morrell (R.148).

The officer then asked

that the cell door be opened, and asked the defendant to
go with him (R.149).

At this time the officer testified

that he heard breaking glass, and as he turned around he
was attacked by the defendant with the broken glass (R.149).
The defendant testified that he had no conversation with Officer Manneh until he had entered the cell
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(R.195).

The defendant testified that he told Manneh

~

was not going, and that Manneh then attempted to drag
him out of the cell and in the process slipped, broke
the jar, and hit his head (R.195).

The defendant

testified that he resisted being transported (R.197),
because he did not feel the officers were justified in
moving him to maximum security.
Officer Wells, who accompanied Manneh to the
cell, testified that Manneh conversed with the defendant
before entering the cell (R.212).

Wells also testified

that he saw the broken glass in Dock's hand, and that
Dock went toward Manneh (R.213).

Wells grabbed Dock

from behind, but did not observe the details of the
scuffle between Manneh and Dock (R.213).
All parties agreed that at the time of the
incident the lighting was fairly poor, but that there
was some light (R.158,216).
Officer Manneh admitted and Officer Wells
confirmed that he was not seriously injured by the
events, and that he incurred only minor scratches on
his neck and head (R.224,175).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
A GENERAL CRIMINAL INTENT IS REQUIRED UNDER
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-103 (1) (b) AND 76-5-102 (1953), AS
AMENDED, AND THE JURY WAS PROPERLY INSTRUCTED AS TO THAT
INTENT REQUIREMENT.
The basic premise in criminal law is, that in a
crime not involving strict liability, there must be both
an act and an intent.
as amended.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-101 (1953),

It is commonly recognized that there are two

types of criminal intent:

specific and general.

The appellant in this case was charged by information with Aggravated Assault by a Prisoner, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103.5 ·(1953),
as amended (R.5).

The following sections of the Utah Code

are at issue in this appeal:
"(l) Assault is:
(a) An attempt, with unlawful
force or violence, to do bodily injury
to another; or
(b) A threat acccompanied by
a show of immediate force or violence,.
to do bodily injury to another.
(c) Assault is a class B
misdemeanor. " Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-102 (1953), as amended.
"Any
intending
guilty of
Utah Code
amended.

prisoner who commits assault,
to cause bodily injury, is
a felony of the third degree."
Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1953), as
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"(l) A person commits
aggravated assault if he commits
assault as defined in section
76-5-102 and:
(a)
He intentionally causes
serious bodily injury to another; or
(b)
He uses a deadly weapon
or such means or force likely to
produce death or serious bodily
injury.
(2)
Aggravated assault is
a felony of the third degree."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1953),
as amended.
"(l) Any prisoner, not serving
a sentence for a felony of the first
degree, who commits aggravated assault
is guilty of a felony of the second
degree.
(2) Any prisoner serving a
sentence for a felony of the first
degree who commits aggravated assault
is guilty of:
(a) A felony of the first degree
if no serious bodily injury was caused;
or
(b) A capital felony if serious
bodily injury was intentionally caused."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103.5.
The case at bar was submitted to the jury under
Section 76-5-103 (1) (b), as it applies to Section 76-5-103.I
(R.13).

The trial court also instructed on the lesser

included offense, simple assault by a prisoner, Section
76-5-102.5 (R.46).

The appellant's claim is that by

failing to instruct the jury as to specific intent, the
trial court committed prejudicial error.
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There are two factors relevant to this claim that
warrant immediate attention.

Initially, the trial judge

did instruct as to general intent (R.48), and during the
course of his instructions he quoted from the appropriate
statutes.

Secondly, the Utah Supreme Court has already, in

dicta, determined that Section 76-5-103(1) (a), requires a
specific intent, and that Section 76-5-103(1) (b), requires
merely a general intent.
(Utah 1976).

State v. Howell, 554 P.2d 1326

In a decision filed on April 24, 1978,

~

of Utah in the Interest of Lawrence Vernon McElhaney, No.
15380, the Utah Court affirmed unanimously the Howell
position that:
11

•••
under § 76-5-103 (1) (b)
UCA as amended, no culpable mental
state is specified and thus under
§ 76-5-102, UCA as amended, intent,
knowledge, or recklessness shall
suffice to establish criminal
responsibility. 11

Section 76-5-103(1) (a), is clearly inapplicable
to the case at bar since there was no evidence introduced
at trial to show that Officer Manneh suffered any serious
injury, and serious injury is required for a violation of
Section 76-5-103(1) (a).

Section 76-5-103 is worded in the

disjunctive, and in contrast to Section 76-5-103 (1) (a),
Section 76-5-103(1) (b), requires merely that the assailant
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"use a deadly weapon or such means or force likely to
produce death or serious bodily injury."

There is no

intent requirement expressed for Section 76-5-103 (1) (b),
At the close of the State's case in chief, the appellant
moved to dismiss the information on the basis that no
serious injury had been inflicted upon the victim (R.178),
and that the assault was no more than a simple assault.
The court denied the motion, ruling that as a matter of
law i t is not necessary for serious bodily injury to have
occurred to constitute a violation of Section 76-5-103(l)(b)
The court also stated that whether or not the broken containf
was a weapon likely to cause serious bodily injury was a
question for the jury (R.178).
In his brief, the appellant has cited several
Utah cases to support his theory that specific intent is
an element of both simple and aggravated assault.

At

page 10 of his brief, the appellant cites State v. Nielsen,
514 P.2d 535, 30 Utah 2d 119 (1973), for the proposition
that specific intent is an element of simple assault.

The

case makes no reference to specific intent, and holds in
part:

-8-
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"
in the prosecution
for assault with a deadly weapon
with intent to do bodily harm,
the actual infliction of bodily
harm need not be shown in order
to make out the offense." 514
P.2d at 536.
In State v. Nemier, 148 P.2d 327, 106 Utah 307 (1944),
the defendants effected an escape from the state prison
by theatening guards with deadly force.

The defendants

were charged under Utah Code Ann. § 103-7-12 (1943),
repealed, which states as follows:
"Every convict undergoing
a life sentence in the state prison
who, with malice aforethought,
commits an assault upon any
other convict, or upon the warden
or any guard or any other person
whomsoever, with a deadly weapon or
instrument of any kind, or by means
of force, or by administering any
poisonous or deleterious substance
which will likely produce great
bodily injury, is punishable with
death."
(Emphasis added.)
It is significant that the statute itself required a
specific intent, and that the mandatory penalty under
the statute was death.

The Utah Court stated at 331:

"By the nature of an assault
it does not require an intent in all
events to kill or do great bodily
injury, but an assault committed
with malice aforethought, does
require sornething more than the mere
wish to vex or annoy the person
assaulted. It is not necessary for
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us to here determine what intent
is necessary under all possible
circumstances in order to commit
the offense charged.
"
(Emphasis added.)
11~

In State v. Potello, 132 Pac. 14, 42 Utah 396

cited by the appellant on page 9 of his brief, the informat
charged "specific and felonious intent to do great bodily
harm"

(132 Pac. at 15).

The case does not say that specifi

intent is an element of simple or aggravated assault.

The

holding in the case is that if an information includes a
charge of specific intent, the information cannot be amende'
after a plea has been entered.

In a proceeding for a writ

of habeas corpus, the Tenth Circuit Court in Green v. Turne:
409 F.2d 215.- (1969), cited Potello, supra, and noted that
"a conviction under the felony statute requires proof of an
intent to do bodily harm."

4 09 F. 2d at 216.

The statement

was dicta, however, and no mention is made of the type of
proof or intent required.
In short, there are no Utah cases which suggest
that specific intent is an element of either simple assault
or aggravated assault.
The California court, in People v. Rocha, 92 Cal.'
172, 3 Cal.3d 893 (1971), noted at 176, that "traditionally,
simple assault and assault with a deadly weapon have been
referred to as 'general intent' crimes."

See also ~'
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462 P.2d 370 (Cal. 1969).

In People v. Morrow,

74 Cal.Rptr. 551 at 558 (1969), the court stated:
" • • • the trial judge took
the position well authenticated in
California law that the crime of
assault by means of force likely
to produce great bodily injury
does not require separate proof
of an intent to injure; the jury
may infer such intent from the
evidence as to what was done by
a defendant."
Other jurisdictions have considered the intent
requirement for aggravated and simple assault.

The

North Carolina court found that intent was not an element
of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious
injury. State v. Curie, 198 S.E.2d 28, 19 N.C. 17 (1973).
In that same opinion, the court at page 30 took note of
State v. Lattimore, 158 S.E. 741, 201 N.C. 32 (1931), where
the court stated:
"It is true that an act may
become criminal only by reason of
the intent with which i t is done,
but the performance of an act
which is expressly forbidden by
statute may constitute an offense
in itself without regard to the
question of intent."
A Florida Court rejected the idea that intent is required
in simple assault, or that specific intent is required for
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and stated:
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"Contrary to appellant's
contention, the gist of the crime
of aggravated assault is found in
the charac~er of the weapon with
which the assault is made, and the
crime requires only a general and
not a specific intent." Bass v.
~' 232 S.2d 25 (Fla. App. 1970).
In State v. Wingate, 215 N.W.2d 90, 191 Neb. 388 (1974),
the appellant, who had been convicted of forcible assault
on a police officer with a deadly weapon, contended that
the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that
intent was an essential element of the crime charged.

ThE

court replied that "[I] ntent is not an essential element
and there was no error in failure to instruct."

215 N.w.1:

at 91.
The Utah Supreme Court, in an appeal based on
Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-6 (1953), repealed, where the defend'
had been found guilty of assault with a deadly weapon with
intent to do bodily harm, addressed the intent issue in ti.'
following manner:

"It is true that the State was unable t'.

prove directly what was in the defendant's mind relative
to doing harm to the victim;" and went on in a later
sentence to say:

"It seems almost too obvious for comment

that the intent to do bodily harm would reasonably be
inferred from the 'slashing' at another person with a
hunting knife."

Chief Justice Crockett also commented tha

-12-
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it is the "elementary rule that a person is presumed to
intend the natural and probable consequences of his
acts."

State v. Peterson, 453 P.2d 696 at 697, 22 Utah

2d 377 (1969).
The appellant contends that by failing to ·
instruct the jury on specific intent, the trial court
corrunitted reversible error.

It is a commonly recognized

fact that the sufficiency of jury instructions is to be
determined by reading them as a whole.

In the case at

bar, the court instructed the jury on aggravated assault
by a prisoner (Section 76-5-103.5) and the lesser
included offense, assault by a prisoner (Section 76-5-102.5)
(R.38-48).

It is the sufficiency of these instructions that

the defendant is challenging on this appeal.

The instruc~

tions included both a statement as to what the jury must
find in respect to each offense and a recitation of the
appropriate statutes.

Instruction 21 contains this

instructions on general intent:

"You are instructed

that in every crime or public offense there must be
union or joint operation of the act and intent.

The intent

or intention is manifested by the circumstances connected

with the offense and the sound mind and discretion of the
accused.

As used in these instructions the term intentionally

means that an individual does something making i t his
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conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct
or cause the result."

(Emphasis added.)

(R. 48) .

The

court also instructed the jury to consider all the
instructions as a whole (R.52).
The New Mexico Supreme Court has decided numerou;
cases on the sufficiency of jury instructions in the past
decade.

In State v. Puga, 510 P.2d 1075, 85 N.M. 204

(1973), the defendant was convicted of two counts of
robbery under a New Mexico statute that did not specificaL
require intent.

The defendant contended that intent was

an element of robbery, and that the instructions to the
jury were insufficient as to intent.

The court held that

even though intent was not mentioned in the statute that
it was an element of the crime, and that an instruction
given in the language of the statute was sufficient if the
words informed the jury of any intent element.

In

~·

Fuentes, 511 P.2d 760, 85 N.M. 274 (1973), the court state:
that "instructions which are phrased in the terms of a
statute which require an intent are sufficient."

511 P.20

at 762.
The Utah Supreme Court has previously grappled
with the problem presented by a statute which, although no·
expressing an intent requirement, clearly required intent
as an element of the crime •

State v. Gallegos, 396 P,2d I·
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16 Utah 2d 102 (1964).

The trial court in Gallegos, supra,

based its instruction for manslaughter on a statute (Utah
code Ann.

§

76-30-5, repealed) that failed "to expressly

require an 'intention to kill or do great bodily harm or
do an act knowing the natural and probable consequences
thereof will be death or serious bodily injury.'"
P.2d at 415.

396

The court approved the instruction even

though the word "intentionally" was not expressly defined.
Solely for the purpose of argument, if the trial
court did err in not instructing as to intent for the crime·
of aggravated assault, in this case where the defendant
was convicted of the lesser included offense, the error
was not prejudicial where the instruction for the lesser
included offense was properly given.

Walker v. People,

248 P.2d 287, 126 Colo. 135 (1952); State v. Gibbons,
364 P.2d 611, 228 Or. 238 (1961).
In summary, the appellant's claim that the
trial judge's failure to instruct on specific intent
resulted in prejudicial error fails on four grounds.
First, specific intent is not an element of aggravated
assault as it is defined in Section 76-5-103(1) (b), or
simple assault.

The case was submitted to the jury on

the basis of Section 76-5-103(1) (b), which this Court

-15-
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st(lted in Howell, supra, required only a general intent.
It should be noted that the jury rejected the aggravated
assault charge.

It is a matter of common law that the

mens rea requirement for simple assault is general and
not specific.

Rocha, supra.

Secondly, the trial judge

did instruct as to general intent (R.48), and jury
instructions are to be considered as a whole.

Third,

the judge's instructions were based on the statute
defining the charges.

Fuentes, supra.

Finally, it is an

accepted principle that a person is presumed to intend
the natural and probable consequences of his act.

Gallegos,

supra.
POINT II
THE INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT ON
SELF-DEFENSE AND DEFENSE OF HABITATION WERE NOT SUPPORTED
BY ANY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND WERE PROPERLY REFUSED
BY THE TRIAL JUDGE.
It is commonly recognized that a defendant in
a criminal case is entitled to inconsistent theories of
defense, State v. Mitcheson, 560 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1976),
but he must present some evidence during the course of the
trial to support the theory in order to have the jury
instructed as to the theory.

A question frequently address'
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•

-by courts is how much evidence must be presented to

support a jury instruction.

The Utah Supreme Court has

discussed the problem in several cases.

In State v.

Castillo, 457 P.2d 618, 23 Utah 2d 70 (1969), the Court
stated that:
" • • if all reasonable men
must conclude that the evidence is
so slight as to be incapable of
raising a reasonable doubt in the
jury's mind as to whether a
defendant accused of a crime acted
in self-defense, tendered instructions
thereon are properly refused."
(Emphasis added.)
457 P.2d at 620.
The Castillo Court, supra, also stated that "the propriety
of an instruction encompassing this principle is necessarily
contingent on the applicability of self-defense in the case."
457 P.2d at 620.

In State v. Johnson, 185 P.2d 738, 112

Utah 130 (1947), the Court held that where there was no
substantial evidence on the defense of excusable homicide,
there was no need to instruct the jury on that issue.

"It

is admitted that the defendant is entitled to have the jury
instructed on his theory of the case if there is any
substantial evidence to justify giving such an instruction."
185 P.2d at 743.

The defense counsel in State v. Talarico,

193 Pac. 860, 57 Utah 229 (1920), was late in the submission
of his request for a self-defense instruction, and the
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trial court refused to give it.

The Supreme Court held

that even though the instruction was appropriate, the
fact that it was not given was not prejudicial error
under the circumstances.

"While the theory of counsel,

persistently and strenuously urged, was that of selfdefense, it was nevertheless all theory and no evidence,
all shadow and no substance."

193 Pac. at 861.

The request alone for an instruction on selfdefense and defense of habitation is not sufficient to
entitle the appellant to the instruction.

Other juris-

dictions have examined the conditions under which the
instruction may be appropriate.

The Washington Court

in State v. Curie, 443 P.2d 808, 74 Wash.2d 197 (1968),
stated that "in a prosecution for assault it is not
improper to refuse an instruction on self-defense where
there is nothing to justify a reasonable inference that
the defendant acted in legitimate self-defense."
P.2d at 809.

443

The New Mexico Court in State v. Romero,

385 P.2d 967, 73 N.M. 109

(1963), used the "reasonable

doubt" standard, and concluded that where that standard
was not met, refusal of the instruction was proper.
The issue in this case is whether or not the
trial judge acted within the bounds of his discretion in
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concluding that there was no "reasonable doubt" created,
and that the instruction was improper.

The only evidence

that was presented at trial that might possibly support a
self-defense instruction or an instruction on defense of
habitation was the appellant's statement that he was
afraid (R.195).

There was no evidence presented to show

that the entry into the cell was unlawful, or that it
was violent or tumultuous.

There was no evidence

presented to show that defendant, as a reasonable man,
feared that he was about to suffer bodily harm, or
that his "houseu would be harmed.

There was no evidence

presented to show that the defendant's reaction was
reasonable, or that the guards had on prior occasions
entered prisoners' cells for the purpose of harming the
prisoners.

Indeed, defendant's own testimony was not

that he struck the officer in self-defense, but that the
officer was injured in a fall

(R.195).

The defendant

testified further that he resisted being taken from his
cell because he did not want to go to maximum security
and that he did not think the officer had any reason to
take him there (R.197).

In short, there was no evidence

presented to support any of the instructions offered as
to self-defense or defense of habitation.
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Jury instructions very similar to those offered
by the appellant were refused by the trial court in
People v. Perez, 286 P.2d 979 (Cal.App. 1955), and the
court found no error where there was no evidence that
defendant was being assaulted, nor any evidence or
inference that he believed bodily injury was about to be
inflicted on him.
The defendant's request for an instruction
under the theory of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405 (1953), as
amended, is totally inappropriate, even under the broad
interpretation of habitation by the Utah Court in Statev,
Mitcheson, supra.

While it is conceivable that under prope:

circumstances a jail cell may be viewed as a "home," there
was no evidence presented in this case to show that the
officer's entry was unlawful or that there was an attack
upon appellant's habitation by the officers.
The Utah Court in Castillo, supra, in finding tha:
the self-defense instruction was properly refused, looked
at the instructions as a whole and concluded that even if tl·
self-defense instruction had been included, the result wou!C
have been the same.

The trial judge in the case at bar was

careful to instruct on the reasonable doubt standard (R.7,L
20), to protect the interests of the appellant, and acted
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properly in refusing the requested instructions on selfdef ense and defense of habitation.
CONCLUSION
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-103(1) {b) and 76-5-102
(1953), as amended, require only a general criminal intent,
not a specific intent as the appellant asserts.

The trial

court gave a proper instruction as to general intent, and
when the instructions are considered as a whole, there was
no prejudicial error.

Where the defendant was convicted

of the lesser included offense, he cannot claim prejudicial.
error as to the instruction given for the greater offense.
The appellant presented no substantial evidence
to support his theories of self-defense and defense of
habitation, and the trial judge acted properly in refusing
the requested instructions thereon.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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